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Truthmakers and explanation 
David Liggins 
 
Truthmaker theory promises to do some useful philosophical work: equipping us to argue 
against phenomenalism and Rylean behaviourism, for instance, and helping us decide what 
exists (Lewis 1999, 207; Armstrong 1997, 113-119). But it has proved hard to formulate a 
truthmaker theory that is both useful and believable. I want to suggest that a neglected 
approach to truthmakers – that of Ian McFetridge – can surmount some of the problems that 
make other theories of truthmaking unattractive. To begin with, I’ll outline some of the most 
prominent accounts of truthmaking in the current literature. Then the second part of the paper 
will explain McFetridge’s theory and argue for its superiority over these accounts. 
 
1 Truthmaking as supervenience 
1.1 Current truthmaker theories 
A philosophical naturalist is likely to claim that our best explanatory theories can be used to 
determine what exists. But how is this to be done? One way of attacking the problem is to use 
the notion of ontological commitment. By this I mean the following: 
 
OC A proposition p is ontologically committed to an entity e iff p entails that e exists. 
 
(I will ignore Quinean worries about propositions.) OC is supposed to be a way of drawing out 
what a theory says about what exists. To find out what existential claims a theory makes, we run 
through its assertions and note down their ontological commitments. In this way we can have 
empirical evidence for existence claims, admitting entities to our ontology for ‘essentially 
scientific reasons’ (Quine 1969, 97). Ontological commitment thus ties together theory and 
ontology. For instance, suppose you are offered a package: a theory and an ontology to go with 
it. Suppose that the ontology you are offered is leaner than the ontological commitments of the 
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theory. Then you must reject the theory-ontology pair. The theory says that there is more in the 
world than the ontology admits to, so together they form an inconsistent package. 
 Truthmaker theories also offer constraints on theory-ontology pairs. The simplest theory 
on the market is Armstrong’s: 
 
A If a proposition p is true then there exists an entity e such that <e exists> entails  
that p. (Armstrong 1997, 115). 
 
Here ‘entails’ has its usual meaning: A entails B iff there is no possible world where A holds but 
B fails. An entity e whose existence entails that p is said to be a truthmaker for p. 
 It is easy to see how A acts as a constraint on theory-ontology pairs. If you assert a 
theory which claims that p whilst accepting Armstrong’s principle, then on pain of inconsistency 
your ontology must contain a truthmaker for p. According to Armstrong, any theory which 
includes a proposition but provides no truthmaker for it in its ontology is contravening the 
truthmaker principle. 
 Armstrong claims that all truths have truthmakers (Armstrong 1997, 135). This attitude 
seems very strange when applied to negative existential truths like ‘There are no giant pandas 
in Sheffield’. What entity could there be whose existence would entail the truth of this claim? It 
would have to be an ‘anti-panda’: something that exists just when there are no giant pandas in 
Sheffield. I find it more natural to think that statements like this ‘are true not because things of 
some kind do exist, but rather because counterexamples don’t exist’ (Lewis 1999, 204). This 
suggests that negative existential truths don’t need truthmakers. 
 One way of modifying Armstrong’s theory is to exclude negative existentials from the 
scope of his truthmaker principle. But that seems too drastic. It is not that there is no link 
between truth and ontology for negative existential truths; rather, the link is of a different sort. In 
Lewis’s words, they are ‘true for lack of false-makers’ (1999, 204). These thoughts spur Bigelow 
to revise Armstrong’s theory. According to Bigelow, ‘[i]f something is true, then it would not be 
possible for it to be false unless certain things were to exist which don’t, or else certain things 
had not existed which do’ (1988, 133). Taking ‘certain things’ to mean ‘one or more things’, this 
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becomes 
 
B For any proposition P and any worlds W and V, if P is true in W but not in V, then either 
something exists in V but not in W or else something exists in W but not in V.1 
 
Bigelow sums up his theory in the claim that ‘truth is supervenient on being’ (1988, 132). 
 Bigelow’s view entails that the only differences between possible worlds are existential 
ones, a feature which David Lewis thought counterintutive. Could there not could be two 
different possible situations where exactly the same things exist, differing simply in what 
properties they have? This thought led Lewis to assert that 
 
L For any proposition P and any worlds W and V, if P is true in W but not in V, then either 
something exists in one of the worlds but not in the other, or else some n-tuple of things 
stands in some fundamental relation in one of the worlds but not in the other. (Lewis 
2001, 612.) 
 
Lewis suggests that principle L distils what is right in truthmaker theory (1999, 224, 206-7). Josh 
Parsons also hints at a theory like this when he suggests that ‘every true sentence’s truth 
supervenes on the nature of some thing’ (1999, 327). 
 It should be clear that the theories of Bigelow and Lewis act as constraints on 
theory-ontology pairs. Principles B and L are both conditional in form: in each case, the first part 
talks about what is true in which world, and the second part talks about what exists or what 
properties it has. For Bigelow and Lewis, truths have ontological implications. 
 Before we see these theories at work, I should note that some philosophers think that 
some of these views do not merit the name ‘truthmaker theory’ at all. For instance, Dodd (2002, 
74 n. 9) denies that Parsons’ theory deserves to be called this; Lewis (2001) seems unsure 
whether his does. Dodd also thinks that McFetridge’s theory (explained below) shouldn’t count 
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as a truthmaker theory (2000, 16 n. 10). I am suspicious of any claim to have found the ‘true 
meaning’ of a term of philosophical art like ‘truthmaker’, but the issue is unimportant anyway. 
Irrespective of what we call these principles, they promise to deliver philosophical results, and 
that is why they are worthy of our attention. Let us turn to see how these principles can be used 
in philosophical arguments. 
 
1.2 Truthmaker theory in action 
One important application of truthmaker theory has been in opposing phenomenalism. I will 
take phenomenalism to be a thesis about the meaning of sentences about physical objects 
coupled with an ontological thesis. Phenomenalists claim that sentences about physical objects 
should be analysed as conjunctions of counterfactuals about experience. These 
counterfactuals are not made true by physical objects, as we conceive of them, for according to 
phenomenalists no such physical objects exist. Nor are they ontologically grounded in the 
properties of human minds – that would be to confuse phenomenalism with idealism. But 
phenomenalism is not an error theory: sentences about physical objects are often true. Whilst 
from some epistemological perspective phenomenalism has its advantages, there is something 
unsatisfying about it which truthmaker theorists seek to exploit. One philosopher goes so far as 
to accuse phenomenalists of ‘ontological murder’ (Armstrong 1993, 187). 
 How can we use truthmaker theory to argue against phenomenalism? Take a true 
sentence, P say, concerning a physical object. Suppose that C is a counterfactual which forms 
one conjunct in the phenomenalist analysis of P. Then P entails C, and so C is true. On 
Armstrong’s theory, C is committed to the existence of some truthmaker for itself. But the 
truthmaker cannot be a physical object as we ordinarily conceive them; neither can it be a 
human mind. To take either of these lines would be to abandon phenomenalism in favour of 
realism or idealism. So the phenomenalist is beggared to explain just what in the world serves 
to make the counterfactual true. The truthmaker principle has detected a mismatch between 
theory and ontology, and condemns phenomenalism on the strength of it. And we can run the 
argument just as well using Lewis’s or Bigelow’s theory. The phenomenalist will be unable to 
name an entity on whose existence the truth of the counterfactual supervenes. Neither will it be 
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possible to name a property whose instantiation is linked in the appropriate way to the 
counterfactual’s truth. For what entity would display this property? Phenomenalism dispenses 
with any candidates. (Compare Armstrong 1989a, 8-10; Lewis 1999, 207.) 
 It is easy to mount parallel arguments against Gibert Ryle’s brand of behaviourism: the 
view which says that truths about the mind can be analysed as conjunctions of counterfactuals 
about behaviour, but that these dispositions have no ‘categorical bases’, that is, that there are 
no mental properties underlying them. As Parsons (1999, 327) says, ‘If my beliefs were Rylean 
dispositions, I could cease believing something without any real change taking place in me or 
indeed anywhere in the world’. This possibility is just what truthmaker theory rules out. 
 
1.3 Justifying supervenience theories 
We have seen one way of using truthmaker theory to get philosophical results. But why should 
we trust this sort of thinking? Armstrong does little to persuade his readers that his truthmaker 
principle is right: he says that it seems ‘fairly obvious once attention is drawn to it’ (1989b, 89), 
but admits that he has no argument to offer. Bigelow also looks to intuition to support his theory: 
‘I have sometimes tried to stop believing in the Truthmaker axiom. Yet I have never really 
succeeded’ (1988, 123). He offers a justification of his view, which has been forcefully criticised 
elsewhere (Dodd 2002, 79-81). Armstrong and Bigelow have nothing more powerful to offer 
those of us who, like Alex Oliver, worry that ‘the explanation of truth making in terms of 
necessitation is richer and more controversial than anything supplied by common sense’ (Oliver 
1998, 539). 
 The difficulty of justifying Armstrong and Bigelow’s theories has sometimes inspired 
gloom about the prospects for a defensible theory of truthmakers.2 But it seems that we might 
be able to justify Lewis’s version of truthmaker theory using premises that are much harder to 
reject. According to Lewis, we can know a priori that L is true. Elsewhere he suggests an 
argument for L, based on a deep-seated intuition about aboutness. According to Lewis, 
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 For example, Dodd 2002 argues that there is no good reason to accept B, and concludes that 
future research into truthmakers is ‘pointless’ (70 n. 2). 
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Armstrong’s theory is ‘an over-reaction to something right and important and 
under-appreciated. What’s right, roughly speaking, is that truths must have things as their 
subject matter’ (1999, 206). Here ‘a proposition is about a subject matter... iff the truth-value of 
that proposition supervenes on that subject-matter’ (1998, 112). Put together, these claims offer 
an interesting argument for Lewis’s theory: 
 
(1) All truths have entities as their subject matter. 
(2) For any proposition p and subject matter M, p is about M iff p’s truth-value supervenes 
on the existence and nature of M. 
Hence 
(3) For any true proposition p, there exists an entity M such that p’s truth-value supervenes 
on the existence and nature of M. 
 
(By ‘the nature of M’ I mean ‘which properties M has’. M might be a collection of entities rather 
than an entity in its own right, but the structure of the argument would be unaffected by this 
change.) Now (3) is just L. So have we found an argument which makes a useful truthmaker 
theory believable? 
 
1.4 Supervenience and necessary truths 
This attempt to justify truthmaker theory provokes two worries. Firstly, we might think that (1) is 
less than obvious, for perhaps logical truths are not about things. But a defender of the 
argument could ask what advantages that view has over the belief that logical truths are about 
everything. Since it is difficult to decide whether the subject matter of logical claims is really 
nothing, or just nothing in particular, I will grant for the sake of argument that a Lewisian could 
reply to the objection in this way. 
The second worry is that Lewis’s definition of aboutness (2) does not capture the way 
that word is usually used. Let p be a necessary truth. Then, because necessities are entailed by 
all truths, p’s truth-value trivially supervenes on the existence and nature of any entity. But 
would we want to say that necessary truths are about everything? 
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We might in some cases. For instance, we have just conceded that the laws of logic 
might be about everything. But suppose that ‘All vixens are foxes’ is necessary. It seems to 
concern vixens rather than penguins or lightbulbs. Philosophers of religion have often taken 
‘God exists’ to be either necessary or impossible without feeling they have to claim that its 
subject matter is anyone apart from God. The philosophy of mathematics furnishes some 
counterexamples as well. Many platonists have held the existence of numbers to be 
necessary;3 but they have not denied that arithmetical propositions (for instance) concern 
numbers alone. And it would seem objectionably ad hoc to ask them to give this up. 
 I conclude that (2) does not have the obviousness it requires if Lewis’s argument is to 
succeed. This is by no means a devastating objection: the argument could be rescued by 
weakening the ‘iff’ in (2) to ‘only if’. But these thoughts might inspire scepticism about whether 
the argument’s conclusion really captures all that is of value in truthmaker theory. For just the 
same reasoning will tell us that any necessarily true proposition will satisfy L irrespective of the 
ontology it is coupled with. And this seems far too easy. If arithmetical propositions are true in 
virtue of the necessary existence of numbers and the relations in which they necessarily stand, 
then it is not trivial at all that these statements are true. Surely a platonist should say that their 
truthmakers are not just any entities, but some entities connected with the the abstract objects 
they concern: numbers themselves (whatever sorts of entities they are) or states of affairs 
concerning numbers, or numbers and the universals they instantiate, or number properties 
perhaps – but not just anything. 
 Another way to put the worry is this: Lewis’s truthmaker principle does not act as a 
constraint on theory-ontology pairs in the way we would like it to. Contingent existential claims 
must have truthmakers: we cannot say that ‘There is a penguin in world W’ is true unless there 
is a penguin in our ontology for world W. And Lewis’s supervenience principle requires this, in 
effect. But suppose we claim that penguins necessarily exist. Surely that means we should say 
that there is a penguin in the ontology of each world. But Lewis’s principle is powerless to 
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 Though platonists convinced by the Quine/Putnam indispensability arguments might not, e.g. 
Colyvan 2001. 
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enforce this requirement. L begins ‘for any proposition P and any worlds W and V, if P is true in 
W but not in V, then ...’. Given that P is necessary, the antecedent of this material conditional 
will always be false, so L will be satisfied irrespective of what exists. Hence necessary truths 
satisfy L merely in virtue of their modal status; you can make any existential claim you like 
without facing its ontological consequences provided you say your claim is necessary. For all L 
says, it could be true that there necessarily exist penguins even if there were no penguins at all 
in any possible world.4 
 Bigelow’s principle begins in the same way as Lewis’s, so the argument we have just 
given indicts his theory as well. Indeed, it indicts any theory that takes this form. 
 Armstrong’s theory has a different structure but suffers from a related problem: it is well 
known that according to A any entity can serve as truthmaker for a necessary truth. As Greg 
Restall puts it: ‘Why should my refrigerator count as a truthmaker for the Goldbach conjecture 
(or its negation)?’ (Restall 1996, 334). In short, none of the supervenience theories of 
truthmaking deals correctly with necessary truths. 
 
2 McFetridge: truthmaking and explanation 
2.1 McFetridge on truthmakers 
Seeing the problems that supervenience theories of truthmaking face, several authors have 
concluded that no truthmaker theory that relies on classical logic can succeed (e.g. Restall 
1996, 336). Instead, we need to use ‘more finely-honed tools’ (Gregory 2001, 427). 
McFetridge’s theory accepts this, invoking the notion of explanation. It is easy to see that this is 
a more discriminating relation than entailment: that ‘2+2=4’ is true is entailed by every truth 
(assuming arithmetical truths to be necessary), but, crucially, it not explained by every truth. 
Knowing that Sheffield is in Yorkshire, for instance, doesn’t help at all in explaining why it’s true 
that 2+2=4. We will return to this point later. 
 McFetridge introduces his theory by considering the question ‘What makes a statement 
true?’. He criticises Davidson’s claim that this is merely a confused variant of ‘What is it for a 
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statement to be true?’ (McFetridge 1977, 37-39). McFetridge points out that correspondence 
theorists of truth have seen themselves as telling us what makes statements true. The answer, 
according to Russell and Austin, is facts. However, we cannot answer ‘What is it for a statement 
to be true?’ with ‘A fact’. As McFetridge says, this is ‘gibberish’ (1977, 38). 
 To unpack this a little, consider the question ‘What makes “The apple is red” true?’, to 
which the correspondence theorists’ reply is ‘The fact that the apple is red’. If the question could 
be paraphrased into ‘What is it for “The apple is red” to be true?’, then the correspondence 
theorists would be saying that what it is for that sentence to be true is a fact. And that doesn’t 
make sense: we cannot answer ‘What is it for “The apple is red” to be true?’ by giving the name 
of an entity. 
 To ask for the truthmaker of a statement, then, is not to ask for an explication of the 
concept truth as applied to that statement. So what does the demand for a truthmaker amount 
to? McFetridge considers exchanges of the following form: 
 
‘What makes the (English) sentence “Snow is white” true?’ ‘The fact that snow is 
white.’...  
‘What makes the (English) sentence “Grass is green” true?’ ‘The fact that grass is 
green.’ (1977, 38) 
 
He immediately goes on to claim that 
 
these questions, and their generalisation into ‘What makes a (any) sentence true?’ are 
not requests for definitions (etc.) of ‘true’ (the concept of truth etc.); but rather requests 
for (partial) explanations of why certain particular sentences are true. (1977, 38-9) 
 
Seen in this light, the idea that a statement is true only if it has a truthmaker turns into the 
following principle: 
 
E For every sentence which is true there must be some explanation of why it is true. 
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(McFetridge 1977, 42) 
 
I suggest that McFetridge’s reasoning here is not wholly convincing. We can grant that 
truthmaker theory isn’t a way of analysing the concept truth without having to concede that 
requests for truthmakers are requests for explanations. Armstrong, for example, would agree 
that truthmaker theory doesn’t seek to define ‘true’5 but maintain that a request for a truthmaker 
is not a request for an explanation, but rather a request for an entity whose existence entails 
that the statement in question is true. The exchanges McFetridge considers could well be 
understood in this fashion. I agree with McFetridge (1977, 39) that explanation-seeking 
questions beginning ‘What makes...’ are most naturally answered by a reply beginning ‘The fact 
that...’. But this fails to prove that requests for truthmakers are explanation-seeking questions. 
Thus the shift from explication to explanation is under-motivated. 
 I am not going to consider repairs to McFetridge’s argument. Even if it cannot be derived 
through thinking about the question ‘What makes a statement true?’, McFetridge’s principle (E) 
is, I claim, powerful enough to do some of the work that the supervenience theories can. I will 
argue for this in section 2.3. It also overcomes their difficulties with necessary truths (section 
2.4). And, just as importantly, it is plausible. 
 
2.2 The plausibility of McFetridge’s principle 
I am not sure how to argue for E; I hope no argument is needed. Whilst E’s utility in truthmaker 
theory has been neglected, the truth of E has often been recognised. For instance, Paul 
Horwich (1998, 104) calls it ‘undeniable’ – he identifies it as the intuition motivating 
correspondence theories of truth – and Crispin Wright thinks it ‘platitudinous’ (1992, 25; see 
also 27). Its scope clearly extends without problem to negative existentials, an advantage of 
McFetridge’s theory over Armstrong’s. 
 One way of motivating the principle is to appeal to the intuition that much of our 
language is used to describe an antecedently existing reality. This is the idea that the world 
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comes first and our talk about it second; in other words, the way the world is takes explanatory 
priority over the semantic properties of our descriptions of it. This means that not only should we 
look for explanations of the truth-values of our assertions, but that we should be suspicious of 
explanations which don’t refer to the way that pre-linguistic reality stands. For instance, we 
should be wary of accepting as fundamental an explanation of ‘p is true’ that merely points out 
that another sentence is true.6 And we should equally wary of explanations that invoke entities 
we don’t believe in. (Suppose a disbeliever in modal realism were to tell you: ‘It is true that P is 
possible, because there is a possible world where P’. What kind of explanation would that be?) 
 
2.3 Demanding explanations: McFetridge’s principle in action 
In this section I want to indicate how E can be used to argue against phenomenalism and 
Gilbert Ryle-type behaviourism. To begin with, recall that phenomenalists deny the existence of 
physical objects, paraphrasing statements about them into conjunctions of counterfactuals 
about experience. McFetridge’s principle demands that phenomenalists explain why some 
sentences about physical objects are true. The realist about physical objects can do this by 
appealing to the properties of physical objects: ‘“The book is square” is true because an 
independently existing lump of matter, the book, is square’. This route is closed to the 
phenomenalist, who doesn’t believe in lumps of matter. The idealist’s explanation, which will 
refer to the way that human minds are, will also be blocked. It seems there is nothing in the 
world for the phenomenalist to appeal to in explaining why true sentences about physical things 
are true. (For a more detailed argument along these lines, see Dancy 1985, 160-163.) This 
reasoning seems at least strong enough to put the burden of proof onto supporters of 
phenomenalism. 
 The argument against behaviorism runs parallel. The Rylean behaviourist claims that 
there are true counterfactuals about behaviour which have no ‘categorical bases’, and this cuts 
off the possibility of explaining these truths as we usually do: by mentioning mental properties. 
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McFetridge’s principle presses the behaviourist for an explanation. But it is very hard to see 
what else there is to appeal to in accounting for the truth of these counterfactuals; we can 
certainly say that any explanation the behaviourist offers will have to be totally counterintuitive. 
 Standing back from these examples, we can see how E operates as a constraint on 
theory-ontology pairs. Imagine that P is a sentence whose semantics are as follows: 
 
 P is true iff X (so P is false iff not-X). 
 
Since this is a statement about what it means for P to be true, we will be able to explain why P 
has the truth-value it does by saying whether X. But, in order to do justice to our intuitions, a 
satisfying explanation of why P is true must talk about the world: it must mention how some 
entities in our ontology stand. This acts as a constraint upon X: roughly speaking, X has to 
concern entities we take to exist. (This is why the sceptic about possible worlds can’t rest 
content with possible worlds semantics.) So every claim in the theory must have implications for 
its ontology. McFetridge’s principle challenges phenomenalists and behaviourists to produce a 
semantics of this sort. The burden lies with the theorist to explain exactly which parts of the 
world he or she is talking about. 
 
2.4 Explaining necessary truths 
As I hinted at the start of section 2.1, McFetridge’s use of the notion of explanation allows him to 
sidestep the problems that the supervenience theories face when dealing with necessary truths. 
Exactly how does McFetridge escape the Restall’s Refrigerator problem? 
 Remember that the problem arose when considering necessities, arithmetical truths for 
example. Supervenience theories which invoke classical entailment make it far too easy to 
provide a truthmaker for necessities. 
 On McFetridge’s approach, the claim that truths have truthmakers is cashed out as a 
request to explain why true sentences are true. And it is clearly not the case that we can explain 
why the Goldbach conjecture is true (if it is!) by talking about refrigerators. We need to talk 
about the entities invoked by whatever is the right semantics for mathematical discourse. 
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Platonists think this will be a realm of abstract objects; on their account, ‘2+2=4’ is true because 
the abstract objects 2 and 4 are related in a certain way. 
 Assuming that statements about God are noncontingent, and that they concern an 
eternal, infinite, aspatial (etc.) being, we will only be able to explain why ‘God exists’ has the 
truth-value it does by talking about this being – by saying, in fact, whether or not God exists. 
This is very different from the supervenience theories of truthmaking. According to Armstrong’s 
theory, any entity will serve as truthmaker for ‘God exists’. For all that the theories of Lewis and 
Bigelow say, ‘God exists’ might have no ontological implications at all. McFetridge’s demand for 
explanation does not make truthmaking so easy. 
 Other responses to the problem of necessary truths drop the classical notion of 
entailment, using relevance logic instead (e.g. Restall 1996). McFetridge’s solution has the 
virtue of not requiring such a change. That said, it does rely on the concept of explanation. 
Some people might hold that explanation is an unpleasantly murky or controversial concept, 
best excluded from our philosophical theories. In reply to this, I would claim that the confusion 
and controversy concern what it is to be an explanation; the notion itself is intuitively clear. After 
all, who could doubt that the truth of ‘Grass is green’ is explained by the colour of grass rather 
than the flavour of pineapples? 
 
2.5 Coda 
We have seen that McFetridge’s principle is intuitively plausible, powerful enough to argue 
against behaviourism and phenomenalism, and immune to some of the difficulties faced by 
supervenience theories of truthmaking. I have not discussed Armstrong’s truthmaker argument 
for an ontology of states of affairs, or whether E is, or should be, capable of replicating it. But I 
hope I have said enough to indicate that McFetridge’s theory is an alternative to the standard 
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